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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the need for a collaborative development tool 
to allow information security experts to capture their interrelated 
knowledge in an ontology. Such a tool would enable 
organisations to make more informed security policy decisions 
around shared security issues. However, population of ontologies 
can be time-consuming and error-prone, and current collaborative 
ontology editing tools require a familiarity with ontology 
concepts. We present a Web-oriented tool which simplifies 
ontology population for information security experts, allowing 
them to develop ontology content without the need to understand 
ontology concepts. To understand how organisations manage 
information security knowledge within policies, we consulted two 
information security managers in large organisations. The Web-
Protégé collaborative ontology editor was then modified to create 
a tool with an appropriate knowledge ontology structure that 
meets their requirements. The same information security 
managers then evaluated the tool, judging it to be accessible and 
potentially useful in policy decision-making.   
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.4.3 [Computers and Society]: Organisational Impacts – 
computer-supported collaborative work 
General Terms
Human Factors, Management, Security. 
Keywords
Information Security Ontology, Ontology Editor. 
1. INTRODUCTION
Organisations need to manage the security of their information 
assets to limit potential abuse or damage within business 
activities. Information security policies are typically formulated 
which stipulate at an operational level how these assets should be 
secured across the entire organisation. 
Currently, information security policies are generally informed by 
a mix of “professional opinion”, staff experience, technology 
manufacturer advice and external security standards or regulations 
(e.g. ISO27001 [4]). Sourced IT security knowledge and 
subjective opinion should be grounded within the organisation’s 
policies in a structured manner. However there are potentially 
vast amounts of knowledge pertaining to information security 
management for organisations available from a variety of global 
sources and represented by a host of terms and concepts. 
This knowledge can be aligned in the form of an ontology. An 
ontology would serve to standardise the vast array of terms and 
concepts, and expose the interdependencies between fragments of 
IT-security knowledge, helping policy makers to make more 
informed security policy decisions. 
Previous work has examined tools to assist CISOs and other IT 
practitioners in developing information security policies [10][19], 
and how they might interact with information security knowledge 
structures such as ontologies [28].  
Information security managers and practitioners within different 
organisations often have to resolve the same or similar IT-security 
issues (e.g. authentication, remote access, etc.) and explore large 
amounts of information when doing so. Dissemination of this 
information throughout the IT security practitioner community in 
the form of an ontology has not as yet been explored as a specific 
issue. However, by making collaboration between domain experts 
an integral part of the knowledge management process, 
practitioners could share their expertise in an effective manner, 
deriving increasingly robust solutions to shared security 
problems.
The Web is a natural platform to host collaborative information 
security ontology development and facilitate distribution of 
ontology content. In fact, collaborative ontology creation is 
typically carried out using Web-oriented ontology editing tools. 
However, current editing tools tend to be complex and generic in 
nature. These tools are aimed at those with experience in ontology 
creation, and not necessarily those domain experts whose 
knowledge requires capture. It cannot be assumed that Chief 
Information Security Officers (CISOs) have the appropriate skills 
in ontology development, as they may be unable to acquire such 
skills due to a lack of time, inclination, or technical ability. As a 
result the process of populating an ontology could prove time-
consuming and prone to errors during knowledge capture. 
Here we consider a collaborative ontology editor tool for use by 
CISOs. We consider how an ontology should be presented to 
CISOs to ensure that it is both approachable and useful. We also 
explore how CISOs might use the features of a collaborative 
ontology editor to derive knowledge to help improve information 
security policy decision-making within organisations.  
Through consultations with two CISOs within large organizations 
we build a picture of the process of formulating information 
security policies within organizations, as well as identifying 
influential factors that arise within this process. Within these 
consultations we also explore the potential to share the knowledge 
inherent in these policies with the IT-security practitioner 
community. 
Insights from the CISO consultations inform development of a 
collaborative Web-based ontology development tool intended to 
serve CISOs or individuals in similar positions in charge of 
information security policies for organisations. The tool allows 
direct capture of knowledge – both from disparate sources and 
created as professional “know-how” – and integration of this 
knowledge into a centralised ontology-based knowledge 
repository. The tool limits the need for users to be familiar with 
ontology construction. 
The CISOs consulted earlier within the research participated in a 
structured evaluation of the ontology editor tool, providing 
feedback on tool design and functionality. Evaluation sessions 
also provided the participants with a tangible software tool around 
which to discuss the preferences they have for a potential 
knowledge-sharing environment. 
The paper is arranged as follows: Section 2 discusses the need for 
a collaborative ontology effort and current construction 
approaches. Section 3 discusses capture of requirements for our 
tool through consultations with real CISOs, and Section 4 details 
the implementation of the tool. Section 5 presents evaluation 
findings from follow-up consultations with CISOs, while related 
work in ontology tools and construction is discussed in Section 6. 
Concluding remarks are presented in Section 7. 
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Communicating Information Security 
Policy Decisions 
CISOs are the primary decision makers on information security 
policy within an organisation. The CISO must make decisions on 
their organisation's security policy that consider not only the 
security of the organisation’s information assets, but also the 
needs of the business and its employees (be this regulatory 
expectations or budgetary limitations). By formalising knowledge 
of various IT-security concerns and exposing their 
interdependencies, the content of an information security 
knowledge base would serve to inform and communicate those 
decisions.
CISOs are part of a wider community of IT-security practitioners 
and experts tasked with understanding and addressing information 
security concerns. Teams of information security experts may 
work within organisations, or may be acting in isolation in 
different organisations to address similar IT-security concerns.  
These experts potentially share information security knowledge 
within informal or closed groups. The sharing of expertise within 
relatively small groups exerts limited impact – sharing of this 
expertise to the wider community exposes it to greater rigour 
(improving the quality), but also helps global efforts to resolve 
what are often global information security threats. 
2.2 Current Ontology Development 
Currently the construction and/or modification of an information 
security knowledge base or ontology would involve the use of an 
existing ontology development tool. These typically come in two 
forms, either graphical or text-based. Graphical tools allow the 
user to manipulate a graphical representation of knowledge 
fragments, while textual editors permit content to be entered 
manually and arranged in a hierarchal structure.  
These different forms of ontology editor place similar demands on 
the user. The tool user must construct a suitable ontology 
structure in the tool before knowledge capture can begin. Due to 
its complex nature this process assumes familiarity with ontology 
technologies. As such, to create and/or modify an information 
security ontology, knowledge is required of: ontology creation, 
including the use of ontology development tools; ontology 
structure and language; and the ontology content itself.  
Most information security domain experts do not have the 
expertise to create an ontology directly using existing tools as 
such tools are complex and aimed at ontology experts, and not 
necessarily those who hold the knowledge that populates those 
ontologies. As such an information security domain expert may 
be unable to develop ontology content themselves, and would 
require either the assistance of an ontology expert or a dedicated 
ontology editing tool that hides ontology complexity.  
Knowledge capture is potentially error-prone and time-
consuming, especially if a CISO or similar is relying upon an 
ontology expert with limited availability who does not fully 
understand the nuances of the knowledge content and its structure 
as they enter it into the ontology. 
2.3 Collaborative Ontology Development 
The creation of an information security ontology is far too large a 
task for any one individual or small team to carry out effectively. 
Derivation of knowledge within small teams also limits the 
applicability and verifiability of knowledge base content.  
Collaboration must be an integral part of ontology development, 
allowing multiple experts within the information security domain 
to capture, integrate, publish and share their knowledge with peers 
and colleagues. Through collaboration these domain experts can 
potentially submit, comment on, and peer-review submitted 
knowledge, with the ultimate aim of reaching consensus on a 
robust body of knowledge. For an ontology of information 
security knowledge to be useful the knowledge it contains must 
be accepted and trusted by both its providers and its users. 
Through the involvement of multiple experts, a larger and more 
applicable knowledge base can be created. 
Technology can allow information security domain experts to 
successfully share in the creation of a knowledge base. The Web 
is a natural platform for collaboration and knowledge-sharing, by 
distributing the development process and disseminating the 
resulting knowledge across the information security community. 
3. REQUIREMENTS CAPTURE 
A CISO use their knowledge and expertise to compose 
information security policies, which then inform the IT-security 
stance of their organisation. We examine the process of 
information security policy-making through semi-structured 
discussions with information security managers, through a 
mixture of surveys and phone interviews. For this we consulted 
two information security managers: (CISO1) has a wealth of 
experience as a former Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) 
of a large multi-national financial organisation, and; (CISO2) is 
an information security manager at a leading UK University with 
previous experience at UK regional councils.
These discussions help us to understand and identify the 
requirements of policy makers when using information security 
knowledge. The consultations also build a picture of how policy 
makers across the community choose to interact with external 
bodies and other knowledge holders, identifying barriers to the 
sharing of knowledge and with this the potential uptake of a 
collaborative ontology editing tool. 
3.1 Consultations
The results of our CISO consultations are organised and presented 
here.
3.1.1 Policy Review Timing 
Within the organizations of both CISO1 and CISO2 information 
security policies are reviewed at regular intervals, typically 
annually. CISO1 points out that although this is normally the case, 
reviews may be forced by the emergence of a new threat or with 
the introduction of a new security technology. With this we may 
assume that CISOs require access to relevant material for guiding 
policy decisions regarding new threats and security technologies. 
3.1.2 Policy Review Resource Gathering 
When reviewing and creating policies, CISO1 refers to the 
following sources for guidance: 
! Payment Card Industry (PCI) [24] 
! ISO27001/27002 security standards [4, 5] 
! Information Security Forum (ISF) [15] 
! International Information Integrity Institute (I-4) [14] 
CISO2 also examines a range of sources for guidance: 
! Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) [16] 
! ISO27001/27002 security standards [4, 5] 
! The Law Society [26] 
! TechRebublic [27] 
Although both CISOs work in different sectors, they both refer to 
the ISO27K family of standards during their work. 
Having to refer to a number of independent sources implies the 
need for this information to be cross-referenced in an appropriate 
manner.
Within CISO1’s organisation information gathered from different 
sources is entered into a software-based policy management tool,
which provides facilities to create information security policy 
database(s). The tool also allows policy content to be separated 
according to applicable roles (e.g. system development, human 
resources, auditors, etc). The tool’s databases are by no means 
complete as they provide only information about standards. There 
remains a lack of coverage of some other kinds of information, 
such as industry “best practices” and information for managing 
human factors within IT security management. 
For CISO2 the majority of gathered information is recorded 
within the organisation “as-is”. Some financial and business 
information is stored as an information base within an Enterprise 
Resource Planning (ERP) system [21]. Less than 3% of all the 
gathered information is formalised and managed within a 
standardised knowledge repository. This contradicts the need to 
cross-reference various sources of information.
Where information is stored, it is managed within individual 
policy categories, This together with CISO1’s responses suggest 
that there are various ways to formalise the arrangement of 
knowledge content into policies. 
3.1.3 Policy Creation 
The policy databases in CISO1’s organisation are used to create 
and publish information security policies internally upon the 
organisation’s intranet. During policy creation, the IS027001 
standard acts as an underlying structure. Internal policies are then 
created according to this structure, and developed through 
methods including benchmarking, forums and use of informal 
networks. Internal policies (e.g. software configuration settings, 
machine build settings) are then quite distinct from external 
information security standards (e.g. ISO27001).  
For CISO2, an internal information security policy is created by 
examining the organisation’s trading environment (e.g. business, 
legal and common practices). CISO2 uses these practices to 
facilitate the formation of action plans or strategies to achieve 
particular IT security-related goals. Policies are defined to help 
realise these strategies and are put into practice upon approval by 
senior management. When addressing an information security 
concern with the forming of a policy, the order of strategy, policy 
and practice is always followed, suggesting that policies must be 
seen to be achieving a goal for the organisation. 
3.1.4 Policy Reviews 
When reviewing information security policy within CISO1’s
organisation, various parties must be consulted both internally and 
externally (e.g. human resources, legal counsel, etc). In a 
regulated industry, regulators must be consulted as they may have 
their own published guidelines (e.g. Financial Services Authority 
[11]). Also, the views of both internal and external auditors must 
be sought to assist in aligning policy initiatives with industry 
standards.  
Once the policy has been decided upon, CISO1 will talk with 
“technologists” to determine whether the proposed solution can be 
integrated into the organisation’s applications and systems. The 
proposed policy is also discussed with “business people” to 
understand how it would be received within the organisation. 
CISO2 also consults both internal and external parties during 
review of information security policies. These parties include the 
University Registrar, human resources, internal auditors and 
external legal counsel specialising in information security. 
Policies are verified by peers and external advisors (e.g. legal 
counsel) together with additional checks by JISC certificated legal 
services [48]. 
These responses imply a need to communicate knowledge 
meaningfully to peers and other disciplines. 
3.1.5 Policy Justification 
For both CISO1 and CISO2 it is the case that before a policy is 
enacted it must be justified to, and supported by, senior 
management. In CISO1’s case policies are discussed in terms of 
risk and what the effects could be to the organisation without such 
policies being in place. For CISO2 debate around policies is 
framed in terms of impact and reach including legal requirements, 
financial considerations, personal data protection and intellectual 
policy. A further consideration noted by CISO2 (but which is 
likely applicable for CISO1) is the commercial and reputational 
risks to the institute without such policies being in place. This 
implies a need to be able to objectively compare the advantages 
and disadvantages of particular approaches to IT-security. An 
ontology would serve to formalise knowledge of security 
solutions and expose their comparable qualities. 
CISO1 noted that situations can arise where objective evidence 
relating to the impact of potential policy changes is lacking (e.g. 
effects on employee productivity). Here CISO1 may rely upon his 
judgment and expertise to convey the reasons why a particular 
change in security procedure needs to take place. However CISO1
notes that there would ideally be evidence at hand to support such 
an argument, implying a need to identify the objective evidence 
underpinning expert opinion within security policy decision-
making.
3.1.6 Policy Evaluation 
Within CISO1’s activities, information security policies are 
typically evaluated for correctness and effectiveness using 
metrics, but this is not always possible. When assessing 
technological solutions it is possible to obtain and analyse output 
from those systems (e.g. the number of e-mails rejected by anti-
spam software). However where the behaviour of personnel is 
involved it is difficult to formulate and measure meaningful 
metrics. An alternative approach might be to obtain agreements 
from department managers declaring that security measures will 
be enacted. These agreements are then reviewed at least annually 
alongside computer-based employee training and forward-looking 
agreements, e.g. “I will comply with these measures for the next 
12 months”. Such “self-assessments” then transfer responsibility 
for security to individuals.  
CISO2 notes yet another approach to evaluating IT security 
controls, where the security policy evaluation process entails 
physically observing individuals using human-facing security 
controls and identifying how those controls are dealt with or how 
they affect working practices. 
Within CISO2’s organisation, business processes are also 
reviewed to see if current security controls are appropriate or 
whether they can be modified to effect improvement. 
That there are various options for managing the assessment of 
information security controls within organisations, and that their 
place within business processes must also be accounted for, 
suggests a need to consider the merits of different methods for 
evaluating security solutions, and equally how appropriate a 
particular method might be for assessing a range of policy 
directives. 
3.1.7 Sharing Policy Content 
CISO1 states that formal and informal groups of CISOs regularly 
meet to discuss security issues and share expertise. With this 
approach, there is potential for organisations to converge on 
similar solutions, even to a low level (e.g. password composition 
rules, password reset intervals, etc). Sharing of information 
security management knowledge then occurs amongst known and 
trusted parties.
In the academic sector, institutions tend to reach consensus on 
approaches to information security through regular interaction and 
sharing of expertise. CISO2 also corresponds regularly with other 
non-academic organisations (e.g. local government). 
Both CISO1 and CISO2 would be hesitant to share policy content 
that exposes the security stance of their organisation. This 
suggests that if IT security practitioners across different 
organisations were to share knowledge, there would need to a 
consideration of how to hide the identity of contributors or 
otherwise maintain knowledge at an abstract level so as not to 
betray its source (although policies may tend to be framed at a 
high, operational level as a matter of course). 
CISO1 would consider using policy-making knowledge from new 
and untrusted sources once consensus is established amongst 
peers. Consensus may potentially be reached through successive 
edits until the content is agreed (i.e. no-one feels it necessary to 
edit any further). 
For CISO2, anonymously supplied information would be 
considered once it was proven successful elsewhere and 
recommended from a trusted source. If such proof was 
unavailable the anonymous content would still be considered if it 
could be tested in an environment of limited impact and in such a 
way that it could do no harm to the organisation. This suggests a 
need for details on how supplied knowledge can be enacted and 
tested.
3.2 Core Findings 
From the discussions with CISOs a number of similarities are 
apparent, from which assumptions may be drawn regarding the 
management of knowledge contributing to IT-security policies:  
! Information security policies are reviewed at regular 
intervals or when new security threats or technologies 
emerge, wherein security procedures are informed by 
guidance material gathered from a variety of disparate 
sources.
! Organisations across different sectors may form information 
security policies, and in turn security controls, according to 
the same guidelines (e.g. ISO27001/2). This implies that 
many organisations have similar IT-security requirements 
which could benefit from collaboration.
! Policy consensus is reached from correspondence and 
discussion amongst peers alongside the examination of 
guidelines and regulatory mandates. 
! All material that informs policy decision-making (be it 
guidelines, regulatory mandates, technical documentation, 
etc.) is recorded “in house” and arranged within distinct, 
specialised policies, although this is not necessarily 
conducted in a centralised manner. 
! Policy directives are reviewed in consultation with many 
internal and external parties, notably experts in legal, human 
resource and technical issues. These parties cannot be 
assumed to be proficient in the use of ontologies or IT-
security. 
! There is a need to compare different approaches to resolving 
information security issues and the evaluation of security 
controls, and to be able to provide justification for policy 
directives. 
3.3 Tool Requirements 
From both the examination of current policy-making approaches 
and discussions with CISOs, the following requirements of a 
collaborative ontology development tool for information security
knowledge management have been identified: 
1. Knowledge Capture: the ontology editor tool must allow 
capture and organisation of formalised knowledge relating 
to familiar information security concepts (e.g. assets, 
vulnerabilities, threats, procedural controls etc). Disparate 
knowledge fragments may also be interrelated, and users 
should be able to record these relationships.
2. Collaboration and Consensus: an interface should allow 
collaborative capture of distributed knowledge between 
disparate parties. There should also be features to allow 
members of the user community to reach consensus (e.g. by
discussing content). 
3. User Guidance: users must be guided through all aspects of
ontology development and exploration using “non-
ontological” terms and concepts. There should also be 
appropriate mechanisms to minimise errors. 
4. Knowledge as Evidence: it may be necessary to present
ontology content to other stakeholders (such as senior 
management) whenever policy-related knowledge is used to
justify the management of risks to the organisation.
5. User Anonymity: users must be able to preserve an
appropriate level of anonymity. Users should not be 
expected to divulge specific organisation security practices. 
4. IMPLEMENTATION
In light of the tool requirements we propose the creation of a 
collaborative security ontology editing tool to allow members of 
the CISO community to capture and share their knowledge first-
hand. Importantly this tool should remove the need to understand 
ontology construction techniques. The tool must allow these
experts to construct and/or modify, share and analyse a security
ontology at an abstract level without the need to familiarise
themselves with ontology technologies. 
The open-source ontology editor Web-Protégé [1] forms the
foundation of the tool. Web-Protégé is a Web-accessible
collaborative ontology editor built with a number of collaborative
features that can be tailored to meet our requirements. 
4.1 Overview of Tool Components 
Figure 1. Overview of ontology development tool’s 
components
An overview of the components of the collaborative information
security ontology editing tool is shown in Figure 1. The tool is 
composed of the client-side Tool Interface and the Tool Server.
4.1.1 Tool Interface 
A browser-accessible Web application through which ontology
content is viewed and manipulated. The tool interface and its
functionality are described in further detail in Section 4.2.
4.1.2 Tool Server 
The tool is stored as a Web application archive file on a 
centralized Web application server. The server provides remote
access to the latest version of the tool.
A War file contains both the tool system files and the ontology
files. Having all the necessary files in a single archive allows for 
simple server deployment. Tool system files within the War file
hold the tool’s compiled source code and supporting images and 
html pages. All of the tool’s current ontology files are stored in
the Projects directory. The project directory also contains the 
tool’s Metaproject ontology file, which describes access
conditions for the tool’s ontologies. 
4.2 Foundation Ontology 
Figure 2. Overview of the information security and human
factors ontology.
To satisfy the need for formalised knowledge and the capability to 
relate fragments of knowledge, a suitable ontology must be 
provided. An information security ontology should define the
most important security issues and concepts and the relationships 
between them. For these purposes the tool uses a modified version 
of the ontology developed by Parkin, van Moorsel and Coles [23]
(Figure 2). This ontology is similar to others that represent 
information security knowledge (e.g. [10]), but informs policy
decision-making further by representing the relationship between 
human-behavioural factors and other concerns within information
security management (e.g. provision of password authentication 
policies that are both suitably secure and realistic for employees).
The ontology represents the security and usability weaknesses of
an Asset that may promote or inhibit certain employee
behaviours in relation to security mechanisms or processes. This
is embodied in the Vulnerability concept.
A Vulnerability may be intentionally or accidentally
‘exploitedBy’ a Threat, which then renders the Asset
potentially insecure. A Threat represents activities that directly
affect security mechanisms or elements of security-facing human
behaviour. For each Threat the Behavioural Foundation
serves to classify behaviours and indicate the concerns that they
raise within an organisation (e.g., a person’s memory capabilities
or attitude towards security).
A Vulnerability may be ‘mitigatedBy’ a Behaviour
Control, which is considered to be a procedural control enacted
by a CISO to manage the interactions between humans and the 
organisation’s security mechanisms. A Behaviour Control
‘managesRiskOf’ a specific Threat using a risk management 
approach indicated by the associated Control Type.
Representing information of this nature in this formalised manner
clarifies knowledge, and by exposing the relationships between 
concepts an element of accountability can be provided to support 
the communication of policy decisions to peers and organisation
stakeholders. The tool presented here facilitates use of the
ontology in this way.
4.3 Tool Interface 
The Tool Interface allows CISOs to access ontology content in a 
manner that abstracts away details of ontology construction. Users 
are then free to view, add, modify or relate fragments of IT-
security knowledge to help them: 
! View information security management knowledge and the 
interdependencies between knowledge fragments. 
! Record (and share) knowledge of information security
concerns (through use of editing controls). 
! Collaboratively refine the knowledge stored within the
underlying ontology, using the tool's collaboration features. 
4.3.1 Accessing the Tool 
Users are initially presented with a screen offering a list of 
available ontologies. For demonstration purposes distinct 
ontologies are provided so as to mirror an organisation’s policies 
(e.g. USB stick policy, password policy, etc.). These ontologies 
employ the structure described in section 2.2, and can potentially
be pre-populated with knowledge content that can be viewed
and/or extended with user-supplied knowledge.
The main user interface consists of a number of tabbed pages
providing users with ontology content, ontology editing controls, 
and features to advise users in how to interact with the tool. Only
authorised users can access editing controls and make changes to
the ontology, by providing a registered user ID and password. 
4.3.2 Guidance for Users 
A “Welcome” page (Figure 3) provides an overview of the tool, 
its functionality, and the base ontology structure, so as to
familiarise new users and act as a reference for returning users. 
The Class and Property tab pages provide the user with
descriptions of the ontology’s structural components and how 
they interact with each other. 
Figure 3: Screenshot of tool’s ‘Welcome’ page
4.3.3 Editing Ontology Content 
Figure 4: Screenshot of a ‘Content’ page
The Content pages (Figure 4) allow a user to view and edit 
ontology content. Any modifications made to an ontology are 
immediately visible to all those users currently accessing the tool, 
thereby making it useful in situations that require newly-available
knowledge (e.g. when a new threat or technology emerges). 
Four separate Content pages cover the main classes of the 
information security ontology structure; Assets, Vulnerabilities,
Threats and Behaviour Controls. This allows a user to access
ontology content from a range of perspectives rather than be 
restricted to a particular starting point. 
Each of the Content pages contains a portlet listing the individual 
fragments of knowledge associated with the particular class.
Selecting one of these individuals will display the properties
associated with it (e.g. the Vulnerabilities of a selected Asset). A 
combination of editing controls and dialog boxes allow a user to 
add a new class individual or change the text of an existing entry.
Warning mechanisms limit the potential for user error and
ontology inconsistency (e.g. to prevent addition of an individual 
with the same text as an existing entry).
Users can also “connect” fragments of knowledge according to 
the relationships defined in the ontology structure. The tool 
restricts the user’s choice of property connections accordingly by
way of restrictive controls, for example a user may only connect 
an individual Vulnerability to a Threat or Behaviour Control via 
the ‘exploitedBy’ and ‘mitigatedBy’ properties respectively.
Each Content page has an information portal providing an
overview of that page’s content and relevant instructions on how 
ontology content may be extended and/or edited. 
4.3.4 Collaborative Features 
A Notes portal (Figure 5) enables users to annotate, discuss and 
reach consensus on ontology content by “posting” messages, akin
to a bulletin-board system. Posted messages are linked with
specific content and are visible to all users when that content is
selected. Authorised users may post new messages or reply to pre-
existing messages via an e-mail style dialog box. 
Figure 5: Screenshot of ‘Notes’ portal
5. USER EVALUATION 
An assessment of the tool’s effectiveness in supporting the
capture and sharing of information security knowledge by CISOs 
(or similar) would require a prolonged study that is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
For the purposes of this paper we conduct an evaluation of the 
functionality and usability of the tool by presenting it to the
CISOs consulted during the Requirements Capture stage (see 
Section 3).
During evaluation the tool was demonstrated according to a 
structured demonstration plan, and the chance offered to 
participants to practice using the tool first-hand. This was 
immediately followed by a series of structured questions that 
serve to relate each participant’s impression of the tool to the 
tool’s requirements (as defined in Section 3.3).
As well as evaluating the requirements that were defined for the
tool, the evaluation sessions provided the opportunity to centre 
discussion of collaboration and knowledge-sharing around a 
tangible tool, eliciting comments about how the tool may be 
practically applied (along with any issues that have the potential 
to limit application of this, or a similar, tool). 
Each complete session was voice-recorded to allow us to capture
feedback from the participants throughout the evaluation process. 
5.1 Summary
The tool satisfies the requirements outlined in Section 3.3. A 
summary of other key points that emerged from the evaluation 
sessions is as follows: 
! The tool is approachable and easy to use.
! Care must be taken if dividing the underlying ontology
according to distinct policies, as this may cause confusion.
! Concentrating the tool towards particular sector- or 
organisation-specific concerns may distort content that is 
essentially shared. Solutions include providing facilities to
"tag" relevant content. 
! Content duplication could cause problems that might only be 
resolved through concerted efforts by community members.
! Collaborative features can help users to reach consensus, but
must provide proper incentives to maintain a collective 
community effort. 
! Users would be able to preserve their anonymity with the 
tool, but would need reassurances that it does not disclose 
the organisation's security posture. 
! The tool can support communication of policy decisions to
stakeholders, however to fully exploit this capability
ontology content would need to include or be enriched with 
relevant sector- or organisation-specific content. 
5.2 Evaluation Sessions 
5.2.1 Knowledge Capture 
Overall, the tool was considered as being approachable and easy
to navigate, with a clear ontology structure, thereby making 
progress towards accommodating the needs of target users. CISO2
stated that “regular IT security folk will be able to dig into [the
tool] and use it”. The tool’s user interface was not thought to be 
confusing but instead very clean, with a “nice flow round the 
screen” (CISO1). CISO2 regarded the ontology structure, 
covering Assets, Vulnerabilities, Procedural Threats and 
Behaviour Controls, seemed “very obvious”.
The notion of separating ontology content, thus making the 
ontology more manageable, was described by CISO2 as a very
complex area, but that “splitting the content into policies makes 
sense”. However CISO1 argued that it might be preferable to 
“slice and dice the content whatever way the user chooses”, and 
that individual users might potentially not recognise policy
content that they would otherwise think is relevant to them if it is
not appropriately labelled. For example, a security manager might 
regard “identification and authentication” as separate
technologies, whereas another manager would regard the same 
content as “sign-on” policy. This problem of potentially
unexpected terminology “makes it less accessible in some ways”.
With the capturing of content, the tool was described by CISO2 as
generic and “open enough to do just about anything in 
information security”, qualified with examples of issues within 
networking management, such as firewalls, denial of service 
attacks, and routing. The tool can potentially capture knowledge 
of sophisticated information security issues which can “become
horribly complex but you could end up with areas of 
specialisation”.
CISO2 suggested that ontology content could be ‘tuned’
according to the user’s business sector, for example banking.
However, each sector tends to have slight differences in
information security needs, and so any content considered
irrelevant to that sector would be omitted from the user interface.
However, it would depend on “who takes up the idea [of the tool]
first, so making it a while before tailoring content becomes an 
issue”. Alternatively, CISO1 suggested that one incentive to use 
the tool “would be if you could tag items to make it specific to
your organisation and then ... download an extract or have a 
version of it which is for your own organisation, so that you can 
ignore stuff which isn't relevant to you”. CISO2 made a similar 
comment that keeps content within the tool, suggesting that when 
users are creating an account they should declare their business 
sector so that the tool may tailor content to that sector once the 
user is logged in. 
The mechanism which detects whether content is already added 
was described by CISO2 as good, but the recognition of similar 
content is not addressed. Not having this feature was considered 
“a bad thing”, as there was potential for multiple entries to 
describe the same concept. CISO1 built upon this issue, 
speculating that duplicates might go beyond spelling (e.g. “pwd” 
instead of “password”) to similar terms that use natural 
alternatives (e.g. "user ID … logon ID … username … 
credential”).
Currently the tool relies on users to use the collaborative features 
to inform others when similar content is already expressed in the 
ontology. CISO2 stated that this notion “would probably work” as 
the “community will police itself to a certain extent but if too 
much policing is needed [the community] will get tired of it”.
CISO1 echoed this – “what's the incentive ... to edit somebody 
else's content?”, “just because it’s easy doesn't give me a carrot 
to want to do it” – and suggested a solution of employing an 
administrator to “collapse” duplicates (which potentially defeats 
the purpose of the tool). 
5.2.2 Collaboration and Consensus 
CISO2 considered the collaborative features very useful in 
discussing knowledge with peers or other stakeholders within an 
organisation. The ability to add notes to content was described as 
“a nice feature” that “added richness to the tool”. When 
discussing a threat a user could ‘post’ a message asking “how real 
is this threat?” while the reply could be “we’ve actually had a 
breach on this”. The attachment of messages to specific content 
made “perfect sense”.
Regarding the collaborative features, CISO1 said that "it's a time-
save thing" so that users are "not having to reinvent the wheel” at
each organisation. However CISO1 also speculated that "within
the organisation, that time-saving doesn't mean anything" unless
it is with auditors. 
For CISO2 the idea suggested of providing additional mechanisms 
for reaching consensus, such as a voting or rating system, could 
be seen as being useful. This would be akin to “Ebay where the 
voting on how good a vendor and supplier are is a big deal”.
Such a mechanism promotes sensible levels of discussion while 
ensuring that content stays appropriate: “You end up with the 
community vetting itself which is what you want to do”. CISO1
speculated however that users might inevitably just “grab” 
meaningful content, returning to the issue of how to “incentivise
people to comment and use” the tool. 
According to CISO2 encouragement for users to record and share 
their knowledge may be brought about by stressing, “this is your 
community and your tool to help you. The richer you make it the 
more powerful it becomes”. A suggestion was to implement a 
system where users are asked to review recently added content, 
perhaps through an e-mail style inbox that highlights content 
added since their last login. 
It appears from the evaluation responses that the need for users to 
be able to discuss content and be aided in reaching consensus has 
been achieved, at least in part, via the notes feature. Realistic 
suggestions for further mechanisms include a voting/rating system 
enhancement to facilitate content selection. 
5.2.3 User Anonymity 
CISO2 noted that the user interface did not raise any privacy or 
security concerns as the user’s organisation is not being identified 
during content entry. The notion of anonymity is achieved by 
users logging into the tool through a ‘username’ alias. CISO2
suggested the tool should “stress the fact that content can be 
entered anonymously and content cannot be traced back to an 
organisation”. CISO1 echoed this concern: “the only drawback 
would be the level of comfort … over the … secrecy around the 
specificity to my organisation ... how would I know that other 
people can't see that?”.
The mechanism for users to create an account, once implemented, 
must “vet people and make sure not just anyone can gain access”
(CISO2).
The suggestions by both CISOs for personaling ontology content 
bring with them similar issues of guaranteeing that personal 
identifiers remain protected. 
It appears from the evaluation responses that the need for users to 
submit information while not divulging specific organisation 
security practices can be achieved within the tool, although there 
are understandably many concerns surrounding the issue of user 
anonymity. 
5.2.4 User Guidance 
CISO1 thought that the tool was helped by a “very nice layout”
that was “not confusing”. According to CISO2 the user interface 
was not thought to be confusing but seemed “fairly simplistic”
suggesting an appropriate level of detail for ‘non-ontology’ 
experts building an ontology of information security knowledge. 
CISO1 suggested that users “might … want to follow something 
all the way through” to “produce another view”, such that the 
interface changes dynamically depending on selected content (e.g. 
moving automatically to another screen). 
CISO2 noted that “two or three different learning styles are 
catered for” by the help features, for example the ‘Welcome’ 
screen provides an overview of the ontology structure in both 
graphical and textual form. “Some people will read the prose 
while others will use the picture. For me the [diagram of] the 
knowledge base structure was very useful”.
The tool has the capacity to guide users through aspects of 
ontology development and exploration, using a variety of help 
features. 
5.2.5 Knowledge as Evidence 
In relation to the potential for ontology content to be used in 
communicating and supporting policy decisions, CISO1
speculated that "you'd want to use this … because it takes you 
through a structured way of doing a risk assessment ... but the 
only way that you'd want to do it is if you can make it specific to 
your organisation", reiterating the idea of “tagging” organisation-
specific content. CISO2 similarly “would use [the tool] and 
happily add content but would need to see the outputs” before 
using it within their organization (“Would it allow me to make a 
business case? … Something that would support that would be 
really useful”) before going on to speculate that if the tool was 
being used to assess threats etc. in a particular business sector 
then “it would be good enough as it is”. CISO1 echoes similar 
thoughts: “what makes it information is the specificity for your 
situation”.
CISO2 noted that an information security manager “cannot simply 
say we need to implement this because we are insecure”. The 
manager must be able to present a business case to justify changes 
in IT security policy to senior management from a range of 
possible solutions, and “the tool allows you to do that”. The 
business case will state “we can do this, this and this to get us 
there and then do calculations to work out the costs”. A scenario 
could be imagined where departmental managers (e.g. finance or 
IT helpdesk) are consulted when making security policies and 
who use the tool’s content to help work out costs: “at the very 
least [the tool] helps to identify stakeholders to communicate 
with”.
5.2.6 Further Comments 
Some extensions to the tool’s underlying ontology structure were 
suggested during the evaluation sessions. Such extensions could 
include – according to CISO1 –, details of "technical controls"
and their threat management approach (e.g. “detective”,
“defending”). CISO2 suggested that policy implementation costs, 
methods of policy enforcement and measurements of policy 
success would be useful (“Cost is a big deal. Quantifying cost, 
cost of implementation, cost of risk etc. [is important] but it will 
be hard to categorise the financial [costs]”).
6. RELATED WORK 
A number of works have been conducted to develop information 
security ontologies, complimented by an array of collaborative 
tools resulting from a growing interest in the Semantic Web. 
Donner [8] discusses the need for an ontology to describe the 
most important security concepts and their interrelationships. 
Such an ontology is needed to provide explicit meaning to the 
current, vaguely defined terminology and allow clear and 
effective communication between colleagues and their clients. 
Vulnerabilities to IT security systems and information would be 
classified allowing the detection of possible threats and their 
countermeasures. The discussion ends with the proposal that the 
ontology should be developed in a collaborative manner. 
Formalising information security knowledge for the purpose of 
auditing and aiding with policy making has been shown to be 
viable through a number of studies (e.g. [9], [10], [13], [23]). 
Fenz et al [10] integrate the ISO/IEC 27001 guidelines [4] with 
their own security ontology which considers the physical aspects 
of information security. Organisations can use the ontology and 
accompanying the “OntoWorks” toolset to automatically review 
and examine IT security policies for ISO 27001 compliance 
and/or certification.
The ontology by Parkin, van Moorsel and Coles [23] that is used 
here has also been used by Mace, Parkin and van Moorsel [19] as 
the foundation for an existing information security ontology 
editing tool tailored for domain experts. Experts are able to 
intuitively capture and formalise their knowledge while the 
ontology construction itself is abstracted away. This tool 
concentrates on single-site deployment, and so is not Web-
oriented and lacks collaborative features. 
Collaborative ontology development permits users to access and 
edit the same ontology from distributed locations. The main 
features identified for successful collaborative ontology 
development are discussed in [3] and [20]. These include 
synchronous/asynchronous communication; proposed content 
agreement policy; annotation of content and changes; content 
provenance; concurrency and version control; and personalized 
views of ontology content.  
A host of generic Web-oriented collaborative ontology tools are 
available aiming themselves at users with varying degrees of 
experience in ontology construction and offering various 
techniques in knowledge capture and representation, e.g. [18, 22, 
25]. A survey of selected tools is carried out in [6]. OntoWiki [2] 
serves to decrease the entrance barrier for domain experts to 
capture their knowledge and collaboratively develop ontologies. 
OntoWiki combines existing Wiki systems and Semantic Web 
knowledge representation models. The simplification of 
knowledge acquisition and presentation is brought about by 
considering ontologies as “information maps”. Each node or 
concept in the map is represented visually in its own page and 
allows intuitive viewing, editing and linking to other concepts and 
resources. COE (Collaborative Ontology Environment) [12] 
builds on the rapid construction techniques of CmapTools [7] and 
its concept mapping system to represent domain knowledge. An 
ontology viewing area and collaborative editing environment are 
combined within COE which then displays ontologies as concept 
maps. The tool converts these human readable maps into a 
machine readable ontology language. Concepts from other Web-
based ontologies may be incorporated into an ontology, allowing 
the capture of knowledge from a wide variety of sources.  
These tools are aimed towards the domain expert and primarily 
attempt to make collaborative ontology development and 
knowledge sharing more accessible.  They do however remain 
relatively complex, are generic in nature and require a substantial 
amount of initial training and configuration before knowledge 
owners can begin the knowledge capture process. 
7. CONCLUSION
We have shown that there is a need for a collaborative ontology 
development tool to allow information security experts (namely 
CISOs or similar) to capture and share their knowledge.
Here we have taken the needs of CISOs into consideration 
through CISO consultations, and developed a collaborative, Web-
hosted ontology editor tool as a deployable application, allowing 
community users to record and share their knowledge within the 
structure of a pre-defined information security ontology.  
The tool has the potential to improve the IT policy making 
process by providing the information security management 
community with a single, shared, comprehensive reference for 
information security knowledge. 
The tool’s current implementation has been evaluated by two 
CISOs from varying backgrounds, meeting with general praise for 
both its appearance and functionality. We look to address 
concerns raised about the control and quality of content through 
enhancement of the tool’s collaborative features. This may 
include provision of a voting system or content-rating scheme.
Future work also hopes to consider the suggestions from 
participating CISOs for extensions to the underlying ontology 
structure, but also the issue raised of potential incentives for 
motivating members of the information security management 
community to contribute to a tool such as has been described 
here.
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